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JURY TRIERS
JURY TRIERS
By R. JUSTIN MILLER*O NE of the steps in the criminal procedure of the state of Min-
,nesota which has been abandoned by nearly all of the other
states' is that of the use of triers in the selection of jurors.2 The
practice came from the common law. The authorities are by no
means in harmony as to the extent and nature of its use. On the
one hand it has been said that the use of triers was limited to the
determination of challenges to the favor, or favour ;3 on the other,
that triers should be appointed whether the challenge was for prin-
cipal cause or for favor.4 Triers were used in civil as well
as in criminal cases.5 They were usually two in number, though
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Bishop, New Crim. Proc., 2nd ed., 698, 737; Clark, Crim. Proc. 453;
O'Fallon Coal Co. v. Laquet, (1902) 198 III. 125, 128, 64 N. E. 767; 35
C. J. 402.
"Minn., G. S. 1913, sec. 9237.
'1 Coke on Littleton 156a, 158b, note 287; Bouvier, Law Dict.; Turner
v. State, (1901) 114 Ga. 421, 423, 40 S. E. 308.
'16 R. C. L. 255 oi. 8. 18 Halsbury's Laws of England 247, note (i),
is as follows:
"It has been laid down (Co. Litt. 156a) that the determination of a
principal challenge is for the court, and of a challenge to the favour for
triers. The rule as thus baldly stated is unsatisfactory. If certain facts
are not in dispute the court is entitled and ought to draw from them infer-
ences which necessarily follow (as did Coleridge, J., in Queen v. Swain,(1838) 2 Mood. & R. 112, where the jurors challenged being examined
upon the voir dire (see p. 251, post) admitted the matters complained of).Apparently the existence of various sets of circumstances had been ruled
by the courts from time to time to be good ground of challenge, and these
rulings left no discretion when similar facts arose. (See a list in "The
Complete Juryman," a book published in 1752 after the passing of stat.(1730) 3 Geo. 2, c. 25). This view is borne out by the recognition of prin-
cipal challenge by the legislature, which has enacted, e. g., in the JuriesAct, 1825 (6 Geo. 4, c. 50), s. 50, that certain want of qualification in a
person impanelled shall, if found, be taken as a principal challenge, i. e., as
something which ipso facto will necessitate his leaving the box. On the
other hand, if different inferences could reasonably be drawn from the
same facts, it would be proper to leave the matter to triers, and this, one
may imagine, was the origin of challenge to the favour and the tradi-
tional method of adjudicating upon it."
See also, an extensive list of authorities collected in State v. Knight,(1857) 43 Me. 11, 70.
'And in this connection, note: "The lords chosen to try a peer, when
indicted for felony, in the court of the lord high steward, are also called
triors." Black, Law Dict.
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more could be appointed by consent or order of the court.6  Chal-
lenges, both to the array and to the polls were tried in this man-
ner.7  In Coke on Littleton is to be found a frequently quoted
statement as to the procedure followed in the trial of a challenge to
the polls :8
"When any challenge is made to the polls, two triors shall
be appointed .by the court; and if they try one indifferent, and he
be sworne, then he and the two triors shall try another; and if
another be tried indifferent, and he be sworne, then the two triors
cease, and the two that be sworne on the jury shall try the rest."
In England the use of triors is still retained for the trial of
challenges to the array for favor, in which case the court appoints
two impartial persons for that purpose ;9 and for the trial of chal-
lenges to the polls, for cause.10 It would seem that the challenge
for favor to the polls no longer exists in England, the two kinds
of challenges now known being the ones familiar to us: peremp-
tory challenges and challenges for cause.":
In the United States the practice seems at first to have been
generally adopted except in New England .12 The terminology
used in the classification of challenges to the polls was also adopted.
We find from the earlier American cases that if the challenge was
for principal cause it was tried by the court ;3 if to the favor, it
was tried under the direction of the court, 4 by triers.'5 In some
jurisdictions, at least, the practice described in -Coke on Littleton
was followed also in this country, that is to say having the two
61 Coke on Littleton 158a.
'1 Coke on Littleton 158a, 3 Bla. Comm. 363.
8Ibid.
'9 Halsbury's Laws of England 360, Crim. Law & Proc. sec. 698.
109 Halsbury's Laws of England 361, Crim. Law & Proc. sec. 700.
"9 Halsbury's Laws of England 360, Crim. Law & Proc. sec. 699; 18
Halsbury's Laws of England 249, Juries sec. 610.
"State v. Knight, (1857) 43 Me. 11.
".Milan v. State, (1866) 24 Ark. 346; Mann v. Glover, (1833) 14 N. J.
Law 195; Pringle v. Huse, (1823) 1 Cow. (N.Y.) 432; Shoeffler v. State,(1854) 3 Wis. 823; Thompson v. Douglas, (1891) 35 W. Va. 337, 338, 13
S. E. 1015. But see Stout v. People, (1858) 4 Park. Cr.' (N.Y.) 71, to the
effect that in such case the challenge might properly be submitted to
triers.
"
4Milan v. State, (1866) 24 Ark. 346; Thompson v. People, (1857) 3
Park. Cr. (N.Y.) 467, 471; Polk v. State, (1918) 148 Ga. 34, 95 S. E. 988.
"Milan v. State, (1866) 24 Ark. 346; Freeman v. People, (1847) 4
Denio (N.Y.) 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216; State v. Potter, (1846) 18 Conn. 166;
Mann v. Glover, (1833) 14 N. J. Law 195, 201; Shoeffler v. State, (1854)
3 Wis. 823; Stout v. People, (1858) 4 Park. Cr. (N.Y.) 71, 109; Berry v.
Wallen, (1805) 1 Overt. (Tenn.) 186; Polk v. State, (1918) 148 Ga. 34, 95
S. E. 988; Thompson v. Douglas, (1891) 35 W. Va. 337, 338.
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jurors, who were first sworn, act as triers of subsequent chal-
lenges. 6
After a time two very substantial changes took place; first, the
use of the terms principal challenge and challenge to the favor gave
way in many jurisdictions; and second, the use of triers was consid-
erably limited and in most states entirely done away with. The old
distinction between principal challenge and challenge to the favor
seems to have been one very difficult to mark1" and consequently
difficult to apply in practice. We find in the older cases many
attempts to define the two, and to distinguish them in order to
determine which should be tried by the court and which by the
triers.'8 This difficulty has been suggested as one of the reasons
why the use of triers was abandoned and all challenges to the
polls submitted to the court.'" In some jurisdictions laws were
passed which permitted the use of triers, or trial by the court at
the election of the parties. 21 In others the use of triers was de-
clared by the courts to be unnecessary or unsuited to conditions
existing in this country and hence not taken over as a part of the
common law. 21  In a much larger number of the states, statutes
"Berry v. Wallen, (1805) 1 Overt. (Tenn.) 186; Mechanics' Bank v.
Smith, (1821) 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 115.
"'East St. L. Elec. Ry. v. Snow, (1899) 88 Ill. App. 660, 16 R. C. L.
256: "The distinction at common law between challenges to favor and
challenges for principal cause is now practically obsolete in most states."
'Turner v. State, (1901) 114 Ga. 421, 423; State v. Howard, (1845)
17 N. H. 171; Milan v. State, (1866) 24 Ark. 346; Mann v. Glover, (1833)
14 N. J. Law 195, 202; Shoeffler v. State, (1854) 3 Wis. 717; Stout v.
People, (1858) 4 Park Cr. (N.Y.) 71, 109; State v. Potter, (1846) 18 Conn.
166, 171; Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, (1821) 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 115; Thomp-
son v. People, (1857) 3 Park Cr. (N.Y.) 467; Freeman v. People, (1847) 4
Denio (N.Y.) 9, 33; Lowenberg v. People, (1863) 27 N. Y. 336, 26 How.
Prac. (N.Y.) 202, 207; Thompson v. Douglas, (1891) 35 W. Va. 337; 339;
3 Bla. Comm. 363; People v. Mol, (1904) 137 Mich. 692, 696, 100 N. W.
913.
"East St. L. Elec. Ry. v. Snow, (1899) 88 II. App. 660.
9Milan v. State, (1866) 24 Ark. 346; State v. Hanley, (1866) 34 Minn.
430, 26 N. W. 397.
"State v. Knight, (1857) 43 Me. 11, 121; O'Fallon Coal Co. v. Laquet,(1902) 198 Ill. 125, 128, 64 N. E. 767; State v. Potter, (1846) 18 Conn. 166,
171; Rowell v. B. & M. Rd., (1879) 58 N. H. 514; State v. Howard, (1845)
17 N. H. 171; McGowan v. State, (1836) 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 184, 193; Mon-
tague v. Comm., (1853) 10 Gratt. (Va.) 767; Rollins v. Ames, (1821)
2 N. H. 349, 350, 9 Am. Dec. 79. See the following from East St. L. Elec.
Ry. v. Snow, (1899) 88 Ill. App. 660, 661: "The common law did not
allow to a party the right of peremptory challenge in any civil action, nor
in any criminal case other than in a case calling for the death penalty.
This right was first secured to litigants in this state by a statute ap-
proved February 17, 1823. Under the privilege granted by this statute,
when a party has grounds for suspicion that a juror does not stand indif-
ferently, he may challenge a specified number, 'without cause.' Since the
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were enacted which expressly abolished the old practice and made
the trial judge the trier of all challenges.2 2
In Minnesota at the present time, it is provided by statute
that:
the challenge shall be tried as follows: 1. For im-
plied bias, by the court. 2. For actual bias, by triers, unless in
cases not capital, the parties shall consent to trial by the court."23
The practice in many counties of the state seems to be for
both parties to consent to the trial of all challenges by the court,
except occasionally in murder cases.24 In the absence of a demand
passage of this statute, so far as we are advised, there has not been in this
state, any. practical distinction observed in the procedure,- between cases
where the challenge was for the principal cause and where it was to the
favor only. The court has acted as trier upon all challenges touching the
qualification or fitness of jurors."
'*Balbo v. People, (1880) 80 N. Y. 484, 494; Abbott v. People, (1881)
86 N. Y. 460, 466; Young v. Johnson, (1890) 123 N. Y. 226, 236, 25 N. E.
363; Borden v. Borden, (1809) 5 Mass. 67, 78, 4 Am. Dec. 32; Milan v.
State, (1866) 24 Ark. 346; Stewart v. State, (1853) 13 Ark. 720; Holt
v. People, (1865) 13 Mich. 224; Reynolds v. United States, (1878) 98 U. S.
145, 157, 25 L. Ed. 244; State v. Munchrath, (1889) 78 Iowa 268, 273; 43
N. W. 211; State v. Porter, (1893) 45 La. Ann. 661, 663; 12 So. 832;
Patterson v. State, (1886) 48 N. J. Law 381, 389, 4 Atl. 449; Serviss v.
Stockstill, (1876) 30 Oh. St. 418; Border v. Carrabine, (1912) 30 Okla.
740; State v. Merriman, (1890) 34 S. C. 16, 32, 12 S. E. 619 (affirmed 34
S. C. 576, 13 S. E. 328); Thompson v. Douglas, (1891) 35 W. Va. 337, 338.
16 R. C. L. 283; 35 C. J. 402; and see note 1; Calhoun v. Hannan, (1888)
87 Ala. 277, 284, 6 So. 291; People v. Loper, (1910) 159 Cal. 6, 11, 112
Pac. 720; Ray v. People, (1917) 63 Colo. 376, 380, 167 Pac. 954.
'Minn., G. S. 1913, sec. 9237.
"The following excerpts from letters received from district judges
and county attorneys of Minnesota indicate the practice:
Alfred Joyce, County Attorney, South St. Paul: "In the two years
that I have been County Attorney I have tried about 100 criminal cases in
the District Court, exclusive of moonshine cases, three of which were
murder cases, and there was no suggestion by anyone that triers should
be used except in one of the murder cases. The use of triers has become
so nearly obsolete that one hardly ever thinks of them any more."
Hon. Edward F. Waite, District Judge, Minneapolis: "Triers are
used very rarely. Only in murder cases and not always then."
Hon. William C. Leary, District Judge, Minneapolis: "Quite seldom,
and only in murder trials."
Hon. John B. Sanborn, District Judge, St. Paul: "We appoint triers
only in murder cases."
Hon. Bert Fesler, District Judge, Duluth: "Only in murder cases and
when demanded. I have used them once in 12 years, a murder case."
Hon. I. M. Olsen, District Judge, New Ulm: "Triers have not been
used in this district for the last fifteen or twenty years, except where the
charge was murder in the first degree, in which case the statute apparently
does not permit a waiver of triers."
Hon. Charles E. Callaghan, District Judge, Rochester: ". . . while
I have been on the bench a little over seven years and have presided at
the trial of a good *many criminal cases, I now recall but one case in
which jury triers were used. This was in a murder case tried over six
years ago. . "
Chester S. Wilson, County Attorney, Stillwater: ". . . In my law
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for triers, consent that the challenge should be tried by the court
is presumed 2 5 It is probably because of this fact and also because
the initiative must be taken by one of the parties in order to pro-
cure triers, that the present practice prevails. As has been already
indicated, the only cases in which there continues to be any dispo-
sition to insist upon triers is in trials for murder. It is very prob-
able that in such a case the insistence, or at least the suggestion,
comes from a cautious trial judge. Some of our judges and some
of our county attorneys contend that the statute requires triers in
murder cases. 2 6 In the districts which they represent, of course,
triers will be provided. In other districts they are not required
except upon demand. One judge reported that in every murder
case which he had tried, triers had been demanded by the de-
fendant.17  Apparently, except for the cautious attitude of some
of the judges and county attorneys as to the way in which the
Minnesota statute should be interpreted, the practice of using triers
would have become obsolete in this state as in most of the other
American jurisdictions.
It is at least doubtful whether this caution is justified. It
will be noted that. the statute referred to28 speaks not of murder
cases, but of "cases not capital." Since the enactment of that
statute the death penalty has been abolished in Minnesota 9 and
in consequence it is difficult to see how there can be such a thing
as a capital case. The authorities seem to be uniform in defining
capital cases as referring only to cases in which the death penalty
practice which has extended over some twelve years, I have never used
them and do not recall ever having seen a case in which they were used.
My predecessor as County Attorney, R. G. Thoreen, says he never had
triers used in any case during his ten-year term. I was court reporter for
three years, some years ago and reported all the cases in this judicial
district during my term. I do not remember having seen triers used except
in one murder case where of course the statute made the use of triers
obligatory."
" S. Bernhard Wennerberg, County Attorney, Center City: ". . . in
only one case in this county during the last eight years have triers been
used, and that was a murder case in the first degree. In other criminal
cases in other counties of this state in which I have appeared, no triers
have been used, and it is the rare exception that consent is not given to
try actual bias by the court."
'State v. Smith, (1899) 78 Minn. 362, 364, 81 N. W. 17.
"See note 24, particularly the statements of Judge Olsen and Mr.
Wilson.
'Hon. William C. Leary of Minneapolis. Judge Leary has been a
judge of the district court of Hennepin County for many years.
'Minn., G. S. 1913, sec. 9237.
"Minn., Laws 1911 C. 387.
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may be inflicted.30 So long as there is no decision of the Minne-
sota supreme court upon the subject, we may expect that the exist-
ing uncertainty will continue. If the opinion of those judges re-
ferred to above is correct in holding that the statute requires triers
in murder cases, it is only a question of time until some murderer
will appeal from a judgment of life imprisonment and escape pun-
ishment because of a deprivation of his right to triers. The lack
of harmony in criminal procedure in the different counties is in
itself undesirable. Then too, there is always the possibility that
capital punishment may be re-established; in which case it would
certainly at once become necessary to return to the use of triers
in murder cases. It must be remembered too that in any case the
defendant may demand triers and procure their use. What the
result of this would be, if attorneys who specialize in the defense
of men accused of crime, should decide to claim, the privilege of
jury triers in all cases, needs only to be mentioned, to be realized
in terms of great expense and interminable delay. In this day,
when the professional criminal well knows the difficulty which
mere delay puts in the way of successful prosecution, it seems c
almost dangerous to indicate the possibility.
These considerations suggest that it is an appropriate time to
consider the institution of jury triers on its merits, and either
definitely to set out and limit its place in our criminal procedure,
or else finally dispose of it.
It is submitted that there is no longer any reason, if there ever
was one,3' for retaining the practice in Minnesota. It is apparent
'Standard Dictionary: "of or pertaining to the death penalty, for-
merly by beheading."
Black, Law Dictionary: "Affecting or relating to the head or life
of a person, entailing the ultimate penalty. Thus, a capital crime is one
punishable with death."
Bouvier's Law Dictionary: "Capital crime, is one for the punishment
of which death is inflicted, which punishment is called capital punishment."
See also the following cases: Adams v. State, (1908) 56 Fla. 1, 48
So. 219; State v. Naylor, (1913) 5 Boyce (Del.) 99, 90 Atl. 880; In re
Vickers, (1907) 201 Mo. 643, 100 S. W. 585, Ex parte Dipley, (1911) 233
Mo. 235; 135 S. W. 56; State v. Wren, '(1914) 77 N. H. 361, 92 Atl. 170;
State ex rel. v. Hackman, (Mo. 1924) 257 S. W. 457; State v. Giberson,(1922) 94 N. J. Eq. 25, 119 Atl. 284.
'IHon. Bert Fesler, District Judge, Duluth: "The practice appears to
be a useless survival from an age when it probably was also useless."
William C. Leary, District Judge, Minneapolis: "My opinion is that
the provision of the law providing for the appointment of jury triers is in
the nature of a throwback. It may have served a very useful purpose in
the past, but at the present time it seems to me is entirely needless. It
delays the trial of defendants and adds somewhat to the expense thereof."
Harry H. Peterson, County Attorney, St. Paul: "It seems to me that
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that if triers are unnecessary, whatever is paid for their services
is a needless expense to the state, and that whatever delay results
from their use, to that extent prevents the expeditious administra-
tion of justice which is being so insistently called for by the people.
Every additional day required to make up a jury in a criminal case
means one of two things, either the trial of other cases must be
postponed, or additional courts, judges, clerks and other officers
must be provided. Neither alternative is a pleasing one to the
people. Just a few weeks ago a prominent attorney from south-
eastern Minnesota made the statement at a State Bar Association
meeting that in his county a five weeks term of court had just
been completed, of which four weeks had been spent in the trial
of criminal cases. As one week was not by any means sufficient
for the trial of the civil cases on the calendar, they were forced
to go over until after the judge should have held court in the other
counties of the district. In Hennepin County it is reported that
the trial calendar is from eight months to one year behind. The
same condition prevails and becomes more and more aggravated
in many parts of the country.
Some authorities are not convinced that the use of triers
causes substantial delay in criminal trials. Others are very posi-
tively of the opinion that it does.' Some attorneys suggest that
the use of triers results in freeing the judges fbr other work. This
is not true as the judge must be present in criminal trials, directing
the whole practice of impaneling juries is archaic and expensive, partly
on account of the procedure employed, and partly on account of the large
number of challenges permitted."
'
2O'Fallon Coal Co. v. Laquet, (1902) 198 Ill. 125, 128; "Under ourpractice the competency of a juror, whether raised by principal challenge
or challenge to the favor as at common law, is triable by the court without
the intervention of triers, and the ruling of the trial court as to the com-petency of a juror is reviewable upon appeal or writ of error. We can
see no good reason for departing from that practice. The common law
method of trying challenges would be cumbersome and attended with un-
necessary delay in the trial of causes, without any beneficial results."
Hon. William C. Leary, District Judge, Minneapolis: "I think it takes
considerably more time to make up a jury when triers are used."
Hon. I. M. Olsen, District judge, New Ulm: "The use of triers does,to some extent, lengthen the time required to secure a jury. It takes fromfifteen minutes to an hour or more to select and secure the attendande andqualification of the triers; then the attorneys examining the jurors willgo into more detail in their examination before the triers than they wouldbefore the court, and in that way more time is consumed."
James J. Quigley, County Attorney, St. Cloud: "I am strongly of the
opinion that the situation could be handled more expeditiously and prop-
erly if triers were eliminated and their duties placed solely within theprovince of the court."
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the triers in matters of law and generally protecting the defendant
from any prejudicial action or misconduct . 3
It would seem, then, that unless some very substantial reason
can be urged for the retention of jury triers, this is an appropriate
case for legislative action. Let us examine the arguments ad-
vanced in their favor. The argument usually heard is that this
is one of the old safeguards of the man accused of crime and that
it should be preserved for that reason alone. This is no more than
one form of the contention that "whatever is, is right." It has
been urged unsuccessfully in connection with many old ideas, such
as "the divine right of kings," "slavery," and the belief that the
world was flat. If lawyers can find no better reason for justifying
the practices of their profession they should not complain at the
actions of legislatures in attempting to regulate the administration
of justice themselves. If old machinery is capable of doing the
work of the present day world, it is retained. If it is not, it is
junked, and new and adequate machinery takes its place. It is an
inexorable rule and applies as well to the machinery of justice
as to any other.
It is suggested that jury triers are desirable because they pro-
vide a more impartial tribunal than does a prejudiced judge. This
may once have been true, but there are several very convincing
answers to such a contention today. In the first place, there is no
evidence in this state that defendants feel the necessity of avoiding
prejudiced judges by demanding triers. The almost universal
practice of consenting to trial of challenges by judges3" demon-
stifates this fact. Second, the practically universal abandonment
of the use of triers in other states demonstrates the same fact.3 5
Third, if a defendant suspects that a jludge is prejudiced against
him, he may secure a change of venue.36 It has been held that,
"The filing of an affidavit of prejudice . . . operated of
Hon. I. M. Olsen, District Judge, New Ulm: "The judge cannot
perform other duties while the triers are at work. The judge is required
to be present and attentive to the proceeding at all stages of a criminal
trial, and must rule on all objections made to questions asked of the juror
while being examined before the triers."
See also: State v. Ring, (1882) 29 Minn. 78, 81, 11 N. W. 233; State
v. Sheltrey, (1907) 100 Minn. 107, 111, 110 N. W. 353; Johnson v. Brastad,
(1919) 143 Minn. 332, 335, 173 N. W. 668; State v. Bragdon, (1917) 136
Minn. 348, 162 N. W. 465; Leystrom v. City of Ada, (1910) 110 Minn.
340, 125 N. W. 507.
"See note 24.
'See notes 1, 12, 21, 22.
'Minn., G. S. 1913 secs. 7724, 7727.
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itself, without any other act on the part of either counsel or court,
to incapacitate the judge from trying the same."3 7
Fourth, in common law days, as has been previously pointed
out, the triers consisted of the first two jurors sworn.38 Presum-
ably, they were impartial and tmcontrolled by the court. Today,
in Minnesota, it is provided that:
"The triers shall consist of three impartial persons, not on
the jury panel, appointed by the court. 3 9
It will be seen that the common law procedure has been radi-
cally departed from, even to the extent of expressly providing that
the persons appointed shall not be on the jury panel. It should
be obvious that if a judge were prejudiced, he could easily appoint
persons who would express his prejudices as well as himself. As
a matter of fact, fair minded persons grow rather impatient at the
suggestion that it should be necessary to create a special jury to
select a trial jury in order to guarantee a fair trial to a man accused
of crime. Counting the grand jury, we have under our present
system provision made for three juries in the initiation and prose-
cution of a criminal trial. As a matter of fact, the appointment of
triers usually becomes largely a matter of form and the persons
appointed, when they are demanded, usually consist of the younger
or more impecunious attorneys "who are hanging around for
crumbs from the professional table." It is to be feared that their
main interest is to prolong the selection of the jury so that as many
days' fees as possible may accrue.
We have learned in the administration of business that suc-
cess or failure may depend on the elimination of small "leaks."
We have yet to learn that the same is true of the administration of
justice. We have little to hope for in immediate results from the
adoption of elaborate new schemes of procedure. It is doubtful
if we will ever make much progress except through small and care-
fully considered changes. But the fact must not be overlooked
that although each change may seem small or even trivial, the sum
of them may produce substantial results. The institution of "jury
triers" is a splendid example of a small leak, expressed in terms of
expense, or of a small obstruction expressed in terms of delay. Its
removal presents a very obvious opportunity for beneficial legis-
lation.
'State v. Hoist, (1910) 111 Minn. 325, 327, 126 N. W. 1090.
'See notes 8, "16.
'Minn., G. S. 1913, sec. 9237.
